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Radical changes in the natural sciences in the 19th century and at the turn of the century had 
influenced the theory of knowledge in the first decades of the 20th century in several ways: (1) 
The cognitive subject was confronted by innumerable, interconnected, and previously unknown 
kinds of cognitive elements and currents (electrons, neutrons, spins, electricity, masses of 
individuals as population strata etc.). As a consequence, epistemological theories had to elaborate 
procedural methods to approach the mass of data and interrelated systems of scientific objects. 
(2) The said epistemological changes in the natural sciences confronted (scientific) knowledge 
with its own historicity. Knowledge was afterward understood as a procedural enterprise that did 
not aim at definite truth propositions. It was, however, considered to have a history and a future. 
Epistemology therefore needed to integrate the historicity of knowledge into its methodological 
considerations.1 (3) Considering the impact of experimental practices and scientific interactions, 
the act of cognition and knowledge production was not understood as an enterprise of finding the 
correct relation between a single cognitive subject and a single object of research. Accordingly, 
epistemology had to define the position and the activity of the cognitive subject in relation to 
scientific objects as well as to other cognitive subjects. The activity of knowledge production was 
embedded in the interaction of a collective system. Knowledge was no longer understood as a 
system of historically independent truths. These epistemological changes brought about a 
procedural, historical, and collective concept of knowledge.  
The emergence of collective conditions and methods of scientific reasoning and activity in this 
period, however, did not mean a renunciation of exact (scientific) methods in the theory of 
knowledge. On the contrary, the emergence of collective or interrelational foundations for 
                                                
1 Cf. Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, Historische Epistemologie, Hamburg 2007 
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scientific activity and reasoning can be understood as an epistemological conception aiming at a 
procedural understanding of the concepts of knowledge, science, rationality, and objectivity. We 
can find examples of the emergence of a “collective epistemology” in Wittgenstein’s linguistic 
theory,2 Fleck’s thought collective,3 social and pedagogical aspects in Bachelard’s epistemology,4 
or the idea of collaboration and intersubjective comprehension of the Vienna Circle5. All of these 
epistemological theories understood collective characteristics or social interaction as an 
indispensable condition for the production of knowledge. My broader project is a research of the 
different conceptions of historical social epistemologies. More precisely, I am trying to work out 
the constructivist account of these epistemologies, the connection to empirical research and their 
definition of collective formal procedures of knowledge. I claim that the attention to collective 
knowledge processes in the first decades of the 20th century is to be understood as the critique of 
a concept of knowledge that is established in contrast to a previous ignorance. It must be seen in a 
broader context of the natural scientific and social questions as a shift from a conception of an 
individual knowledge production to a collectively constituted knowledge. It relates knowledge 
not only to a simultaneous collective constitution but also to a collective procedure in the course 
of time and in relation to previous and future acts of knowledge.  
In this talk, I focus on Edgar Zilsel’s6 epistemology in the 1920s and 1930s, which integrates 
collaboration processes as an essential aspect to the production of knowledge. I will first try to 
give a brief overview of Zilsel’s basic assumptions about what kind of nature we are confronted 
with and then try to draw the epistemological consequences from this cognitive background. I 
will try to show how Zilsel aimed at establishing the same methodological foundation for the 
natural sciences, history and the humanistic studies as well as everyday experience. One of 
Zilsel’s basic postulations was that all the sciences (including the humanities) – aiming at 
accuracy, revisability, and an empiricist foundation – needed to be modeled after the quantitative 
methods of the natural sciences. This position was related to the epistemological consequence 
                                                
2 David Bloor, Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge, London 1983 
3 Cf. for example Jan Doroszewski, „A Methodological Discussion of Ludwik Fleck’s Concepts of Thought 
Collective and Thought Style“, in B. Choluj, J. C. Joerden (ed.), Von der wissenschaftlichen Tatsache zur 
Wissensproduktion: Ludwik Fleck und seine Bedeutung für die Wissenschaft und Praxis, Frankfurt am Main, 2007 
4 Cristina Chimisso, „From phenomenology to phenomenotechnique: the role of early twentieth-century physics in 
Gaston Bachelard’s philosophy“, Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 39 (2008), p. 390 
5 Ernst Mach Society (ed.), Manifesto „Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Der Wiener Kreis“ (1929), in Wiener 
Kreis: Texte zur wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung von Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath, Moritz Schlick, Philipp 
Frank, Hans Hahn, Karl Menger, Edgar Zilsel und Gustav Bergmann, ed. Michael Stöltzner und Thomas Uebel, 
Hamburg 2006, p. 11. 
6 1891 Vienna – 1944 Oakland, CA 
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that Zilsel, as I will try to show later, gave up the concept of rigid natural scientific laws, 
independent of any historical or empirical development and, on the contrary, emphasized their 
provisional and unstable character. 
 
 
Rationalizing the irrational and statistics as a cognitive method 
Zilsel first considered the production of knowledge in his doctoral thesis of 19167 in which he 
was concerned with the question of how to bridge the gap between rationality and theoretical 
scientific reasoning on the one hand and the complex variety of the given material on the other 
hand. How can theories be applied to reality, how can we define the yet undefined, how can 
rational reasoning be applied to the irrationality of given data? – With these questions Zilsel was 
concerned when he remarked on the „problem of application“.  He tried to provide a 
methodological foundation for the question why the irrational character of nature could be 
handled rationally. Zilsel’s epistemology did not start from an originally ignorant subject that 
faces the problem of how to gain accurate information corresponding to a reality that is 
considered to be exterior to her sensual abilities. On the contrary, he started from the opposite 
concept of knowledge and reality taking the condition of being overwhelmed with a mass of data 
as the original condition of all cognitive subjects. How can we make definite propositions about 
reality even though we are overwhelmed with yet undefined data and although we know that 
there will always be additional material which is yet unknown? On which basis can we ground 
our knowledge about the complex and mutable multiplicity of reality which can be regarded as 
accurate, rational, as well as checkable/revisable (“überprüfbar”)? Since Zilsel did not formulate 
any holistic concept as the focus of attention for the production of knowledge, he had to define 
the process of knowledge production itself including the definition of methods as well as the 
activity of the cognitive subjects in relation to objects and in their interaction. Both come 
together in the joint collection of empirical data and in the statistical processing of this data with 
a view to inductive methods. Zilsel proposed to understand the production of knowledge about 
nature, i.e. the production of reality, as the application of statistical induction and probability 
calculation to empirical data. Any knowledge about “reality” can thus never be fabricated from 
single empirical facts but always needs to be understood as the result of an extrapolation from big 
                                                
7 Edgar Zilsel, Das Anwendungsproblem. Ein philosophischer Versuch über das Gesetz der großen Zahlen und die 
Induktion, Leipzig 1916 
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quantities of data to assess future developments. Zilsel’s epistemological position must therefore 
be understood from the angle of mass phenomena. Probabilistic propositions can only explain a 
mass of data but not individual phenomena. They express the probabilistic and temporal relation 
between two entities: the known data content and the expected data content. Propositions about 
reality can thus only be understood as theories about the properties of a large number of 
interrelated empirical data. Zilsel’s statistical epistemology avoids predefining the results of a 
scientific investigation but only points to methods of how to implement an infinite process of 
reducing the yet unknown.8 Since Zilsel understood the production of knowledge as the rational 
processing of mass data it is methodologically inherent to his procedural account of epistemology 
that a single cognitive subject cannot handle the mass of data. Producing knowledge by ways of 
collecting and processing manifold data is connected to the idea of cooperation or collaboration 
aiming at a “rationalized” understanding of processes in nature.9 
In his mathematical article “Attempt at a New Foundation of Statistical Mechanics”, Zilsel 
elaborated the statistical methods for the production of knowledge considering complex physical 
processes. By discussing the application of statistical mechanics to the theory of gases (mainly 
referring to the theories of Ludwig Boltzmann and Richard von Mises), Zilsel’s main concern 
still was the applicability of probability theory to empirical reality10, an issue that was also related 
to his epistemological concerns. Contrary to Boltzmann’s “ergodic hypothesis” assuming an 
equal possibility of all constellations in a closed system of observation, he proposed an additional 
claim assuming that all processes in nature essentially underlie a constant process of 
diversification. This so called allagodic hypothesis has two methodological consequences: (1) It 
points out that any scientifically examined system needs to be considered as a constructive entity 
and is based on defining an observational period as well as observation criteria. (2) Every 
investigation has to define the starting conditions of the investigated substances by means of 
empirical research (gas molecules, stars, etc. – in Zilsel’s later historical writings this applies also 
to human beings and socio-economic data).  This implies that the behavior of mass phenomena 
cannot only be described by means of the theoretical definition of their behavior (laws) but needs 
to be related to the initial empirical constellation of a process and its irreversible direction in the 
                                                
8 Ibid., p. 99 
9 See the chapter on the collective foundation of cognition below. 
10 Edgar Zilsel, Versuch einer Grundlegung der statistischen Mechanik, in Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik, 
1921, vol. 31, p. 120 
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succession of time.11 Whereas the natural laws (in form of functional relations) only give formal 
descriptions of physical processes, they need to be connected to the empirically determinable 
constellation data. To research objects as mutable processes of mass phenomena thus necessarily 
aims at laws of regularities based on the constructive assumption that nature is manifold, and that 
stability or regular behavior of processes can only be found through an empirical definition of 
specific constellations. At the same time, the allagodic hypothesis emphasizes the constructive 
and normative aspect of the production of knowledge about reality as a process. We can 
understand the methodological part of defining the period and the according empirical criteria of 
research as the need to indicate the specific question and standpoint of an investigation. Thus we 
must consider the interrelation of the two methodological parts of the allagodic hypothesis 
regarding Zilsel’s emphasis on the applicability of theories to the infinite empirical of real 
processes. The activity of application is the very crucial point where the empirical informs the 
constructive practice and vice versa the constructive activity informs the choice, criteria, and 
conception of the specific empirical data. In this circularity of the theoretical and the empirical 
practice, we have to consider the concept of the empirical in the cognitive process as not merely 
“given” but as constructively defined. This circular interaction transforms both the constructive 
as well as the empirical share of the production of knowledge into an infinite enterprise. 
 
Induction, probabilistic reality, pragmatism 
In Zilsel’s epistemology, induction and probability theory are essentially related. The production 
of “reality,” and the production of scientific objects are related to the methodological problem of 
collecting and processing mass data. This is the fundamental form of the production of 
knowledge leading to a procedural and infinite character of Zilsel’s epistemology.  
Zilsel explicitly extended his epistemological theory and the problem of induction from the 
natural sciences to a general theory of knowledge.12 He pointed out the normative dimension of 
                                                
11 Already in this article, Zilsel’s main concern was the problem of how to explain the irreversibility of all complex 
physical and natural processes theoretically. I will get back to the relevance of the issue of irreversibility and the 
problem of the definition of starting conditions for every observation of an isolated historical or social process in 
Zilsel’s epistemological considerations below. 
12 Zilsel’s emphasis on the role of induction for the cognitive process in relation to a statistical empiricism needs to 
be understood as a contrary position to the emphasis of the method of deduction in the logical empiricism of the 
Vienna Circle. Cf. for example Otto Neurath, “Zur Induktionsfrage”, in id., Gesammelte philosophische und 
methodologische Schriften, ed. R. Haller, H. Rutte, vol. 2, Wien 1981. Cf. also the article of J. Lenhard and W. 
Krohn on Zilsel’s foundation of physical and socio-historical laws (2006) in which they analyse the concept of 
induction in Zilsel’s early works in comparison to Reichenbach’s scientific methodology. Reichenbach’s concept of 
induction emphasized the method of a constructive modelling, followed by inductive testing only as a second step. 
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an epistemology that proposes an understanding of knowledge as an infinite process: He 
understood natural laws or scientific proposition as well as any statement of everyday experience 
as regulative instructions in order to make further propositions about reality. According to Zilsel, 
every proposition about “real” processes, in nature or in history, contains the following 
instructive suppositions: “I had certain experiences, other people wrote or gave the according 
statements and all further historical sources, reference etc. will fit in accordingly.“13 Having 
experiences at the present moment can only result in subjective phenomenological propositions, 
the construction of „reality“, however – in science as well as in everyday experience – is always 
connected to the expectation that all future experiences or testimony will be consistent with the 
previous experiences or testimony. For Zilsel, the construction of a „reality that is independent of 
conscious cognitive acts“ thus does not imply testing theoretical assumptions in relation to an 
external reality. “Reality”, however, is to be understood as an inductive extrapolation from 
present experiences to the future. Zilsel thus suggested a statistical and inductive understanding 
of all cognitive acts concerned with “reality”. This is the perspective from which Zilsel suggested 
the concept of probability in order to give a rule how to judge which propositions about reality 
are more reliable and which are less so. In terms of statistics, a proposition about future 
developments is more reliable the more cases are observed and the larger the inductive series is 
constructed. This holds true – according to Zilsel – for scientific propositions as well as for 
everyday experience and represents the problem of induction.  
 
Searching for laws: The natural scientific laws and developments in society and history 
In his book “The Emergence of the Concept of Genius” Zilsel starts out with the premise that the 
term genius does not describe the quality of a single human being but is a concept formed by 
public opinion, and should therefore be examined as a structure involving social mass 
phenomena. This required a historico-statistical research method aiming at explaining the causal 
relations of social processes and the inherent image of excellent intellectual or creative work in 
order to formulate a list of general sociological laws of the emergence of the concept of genius14.  
                                                
13 University of Konstanz Archives, Schlick papers, letter from Zilsel to Schlick, undated (about 1931), p. 2: „ich 
[hatte] gewisse Erlebnisse, andere Leute schreiben oder sagen Entsprechendes und alle weiteren Geschichtsquellen, 
Zeugnisse usf. werden sich entsprechend einfügen.“ 
14 Edgar Zilsel, Die Entstehung des Geniebegriffs. Ein Beitrag zur Ideengeschichte der Antike und des 
Frühkapitalismus, Hildesheim/New York 1972 (reprint of the issue Tübingen 1926), pp. 323-326 
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Zilsel’s contemporaries harshly criticized the search for historical laws. The most common 
critique emphasized that whereas in nature processes could be observed which are always 
repeated identically, in history and in social developments occurrences never recur in exactly the 
same way.15 With a view to the application of statistical mechanics in the theory of gases16 and to 
statistical astronomy17, Zilsel pointed to the structural similarity of the methodological problems 
in all disciplines researching the regularities of mass phenomena. Whereas he thus parallelized 
the methodology of the natural sciences and the humanities and aimed at introducing natural 
scientific methods to the humanistic disciplines, he conversely destabilized the traditionally rigid 
image of natural scientific concepts and objects. He emphasized that not only historical and 
biological processes but all physical macrostructures were irreversible. Even natural scientific 
laws would not unveil processes that were exactly identically repeatable. Zilsel tried to show that 
the general criticism of the search for historical laws had an erroneous idea of the function of 
laws in the natural sciences. Thus insisting on the irreversibility of historical developments was 
not to be considered an argument against the feasibility of historical laws. On the contrary, in 
statistical physics, irreversibility was the decisive epistemological condition for the research of 
the lawful characteristics of substances which were understood as a mass phenomenon of a large 
number of elements. Zilsel’s statistical epistemology aimed at pointing to the procedural and 
varied constitution of every scientific object. He tried to show that although – or more precisely: 
because – all processes (physical, biological, and historical) are essentially irreversible, unstable, 
and mutable, every discipline has to determine the specific laws and regularities of its object of 
research. 
Comparing Zilsel’s mathematical text about statistical mechanics in gas theory, we can find the 
same methodological foundation in his historical studies related to his project of the sociological 
roots of modern science, namely the necessity (1) to isolate phenomena of mass elements in 
processes of fluctuation in order to examine their lawful behavior18 and, (2) to define the initial 
                                                
15 Cf. for example Leo Jordan, review of Zilsel’s „Die Entstehung des Geniebegriffs“, in Zeitschrift für romanische 
Philologie, vol. 50, 1930, pp. 363-369. 
16 Cf. for example Ludwig Boltzmann, Lectures on Gas Theory (1896-1898), University of California Press, 
Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1964. 
17 Cf. for example Arthur S. Eddington, Stellar Movements and the Structure of the Universe, London 1914. 
18 Edgar Zilsel, “Problems of Empiricism”, in Zilsel (2000), p. 195: “Social groups are seldom isolated and usually 
interact with one another; the number of their members is always comparatively small; the members are very 
different, and some of them exert disproportionate influence. These conditions do not favor group laws. With a gas 
enclosed in a vessel with permeable walls and consisting of only a million molecules, a few of them being extremely 
large, rather inexact gas laws could be ascertained. It is possible that in sociology, also, only very inexact regularities 
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constellations of the isolated systems empirically in order to predict their possible 
developments.19 Relating history and the natural sciences, empirical and theoretical research, 
Zilsel thus tried to establish a scientific history based on natural scientific methods. Conversely, 
he historicized natural scientific objects and laws and emphasized that they were to investigate 
historically. 
 
Political relevance of the search for laws 
Zilsel’s epistemological considerations need to be understood against the background of his 
interest in the natural sciences20 as well as his position in the tradition of Marxist thinking.21  
The issue of population, the question of how to explain social developments in order to 
understand and organize them, and the interest in the relation of different population strata arose 
more and more in the contemporary discourse. Since the First World War and throughout the 
1920s, demography did not yet exist as an individual institutional scientific discipline. In 
Germany and Austria, however, the issue of population was discussed lively in politics, in 
different scientific disciplines (from national economics to biology) as well as in the intellectual 
scene.22 Zilsel pursued two interrelated paths in his intellectual work both influenced by his 
natural scientific as well as his social interests: the analysis of historical as well as contemporary 
intellectual developments on the basis of demographic changes on the one hand, and the 
theoretical foundation of knowledge based on mass phenomena and the feasibility of laws of their 
regularities on the other hand.23 The former can be read as a contribution to the formation of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
can be discovered. Yet, no physicist or astronomer would entirely disregard a regularity on the ground that it did not 
always hold.” 
19 Zilsel, „Physics and the Problem of Historico-Sociological Laws“, in Zilsel (2000), p. 200: “Astronomers can not 
predict from Newton’s law what the position of the planet Mars will be on the next New Year’s Eve. In addition to 
the law they need the knowledge of the positions, velocities, and masses of a few celestial bodies at some given time: 
they need knowledge of ‘initial conditions’ as the physicist puts it. Knowledge of a law, therefore, is not a sufficient 
but only a necessary condition of prediction. Evidently the same holds for history. Even if laws according to which 
wars between industrialized countries proceed were known, it might still be impossible to predict the outcome of the 
present war. Among other more intricate things we do not know is e.g. the number of airplanes on both sides.” 
20 Besides philosophy, Zilsel also studied mathematics and physics, and he later also got interested in biology, 
evolutionary theory and psychophysics. 
21 Zilsel was a member of the Austrian Social Democrat Party, taught courses in the left wing oriented Viennese 
adult education and published articles in the Social Democrat journal Der Kampf.  
22 Cf. Rainer Mackensen (ed.), Bevölkerungslehre und Bevölkerungspolitik vor 1933, Opladen 2002; Articles on 
demographic increase and population politics in Der Kampf. Sozialdemokratische Monatsschrift, vol. 13 (1920, vol. 
14 (1921), vol. 19 (1926), vol. 21 (1928) 
23 Cf. Zilsel (2000), in which Wolfgang Krohn and Diederick Raven – referring to a letter from Zilsel to Leo 
Löwenthal of the International Institute of Social Research of April 21, 1939 – assume a relation of Zilsel’s projects 
on the social origins of modern science and on the laws of nature and of history starting about 1930. I would like to 
suggest that in the broader sense of his two concerns – the historical and social analysis and the epistemological 
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history of science24 or as early attempts at the formation of the sociology of science25, whereas 
the latter must be examined as a contribution to the theory of knowledge. 
Searching for historical laws represents the methodological consequence of the structural turn in 
the view of scientific objects as mutable mass phenomena. Zilsel considered the epistemological 
foundation of a scientific method for the search for laws as the most urgent scientific problem of 
his period: For him, it was the key to a unification of the scientific disciplines since it would 
establish knowledge about “reality” as propositions about regularities of an interrelational system 
of variable and irreversible processes.26 The research of historical and social regularities was to 
be based on empirical facts solely. In this respect, Zilsel repeatedly pointed out the coaction of 
the natural sciences, mathematics, philosophy, economy and philology in the materialist 
historiography.27 For Zilsel, materialist theory and Marxist socialism not only served as a 
political theory but must be understood as a comprehensive scientific-political program, which 
furthered the amalgamation of natural scientific and historico-sociological thinking.28  
 
The collective foundation of the production of knowledge 
Zilsel’s epistemological position can be summarized as follows: The cognitive subject is not 
confronted with a single object but with an accumulation of an infinite and mutable mass of 
elements. This infinite and indefinite material needs to be rationalized, i.e. defined. The 
                                                                                                                                                        
theory – Zilsel started his work in both directions around 1920 with his cultural theory “Die Geniereligion” (“The 
Religion of Genius”) in 1918, the historical project on the formation of the concept of genius, and his theoretical 
article “Versuch einer neuen Grundlegung der statistischen Mechanik” (“Attempt at a New Foundation of Statistical 
Mechanics”) in 1921. Even in his doctoral thesis in the field of the theory of cognition, we can find a relation to 
population issues and the practical application of this theoretical position in the working methods of insurance 
companies. 
24 Cf. Kurt Rudolf Fischer, “Das historische Bewußtsein bei Carnap, Reichenbach und Zilsel”, in: Wien-Berlin-Prag. 
Der Aufstieg der wissenschaftlichen Philosophie. Zentenarien Rudolf Carnap – Hans Reichenbach – Edgar Zilsel, ed. 
Rudolf Haller und Friedrich Stadler, Wien 1993, p. 559 
25 Cf. Wolfgang Krohn, „Zur soziologischen Interpretation der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft“, in Edgar Zilsel, Die 
sozialen Ursprünge der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft, ed. W. Krohn, Frankfurt/Main 1976, pp. 7-43 
26 Edgar Zilsel, „Soziologische Bemerkungen zur Philosophie der Gegenwart“, in Der Kampf, 1930, vol. 23, p. 411: 
„Wenn es heute ein Problem gibt, das ungelöst und wissenschaftsverbindend, das also wahrhaft philosophisch ist, so 
ist es doch wohl das Problem der historischen Gesetze.“ 
27 Ibid., pp . 86-87: „Hast du bei Marx nicht gelernt, was Wissenschaft bedeutet? Vertief dich in die 
Naturwissenschaft und die Mathematik, studiere die klassische Philosophie, benütze immer wieder den 
Gelehrtenfleiß und die Gründlichkeit der Historiker, der Wirtschaftsforscher, der Philologen und lerne von ihnen!“ 
28 Edgar Zilsel, „Philosophische Bemerkungen“, in Der Kampf, 1929, vol. 22, p. 186: „Jenes wirkliche Leben zum 
Beispiel, das sich heute in der Philosophie zu regen beginnt, wurzelt doch nur in der Mathematik und 
Naturwissenschaft unserer Zeit, vor allem in der mathematischen Physik; es fehlt dieser Philosophie, so jung und 
kühn sie ist, sehr zu ihrem Schaden das Verständnis und das Interesse für Geschichte und Gesellschaft. An dem 
marxistischen Sozialismus aber kann man historisch denken und die gewaltigen Probleme der Gesellschaft sehen 
lernen, kann man lernen, daß die Geschichte unter allen gesetzmäßigen Naturvorgängen der verwickeltste und auch 
Naturwissenschaft gesellschaftlich bedingt ist.“ 
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production of knowledge thus comprised of the application of theories to empirical constellations, 
the collection of empirical data, its processing by means of statistical methods, the observation 
and documentation of periodical regularities in closed systems, as well as inductive conclusions 
creating knowledge as a system of instructions for making statements about “reality”. The 
quantification of scientific objects or of cognitive objects in general and the application of 
quantitative and statistical methods to these objects are related to an anti-individualistic 
foundation of knowledge. The aim of this epistemological position is to found knowledge as a 
procedure that is both accurate and revisable. It incorporates collective cognitive activity in two 
ways: in the collection and processing of data as well as in the construction and revision of 
theories. Knowledge is therefore a jointly defined operation of achieving scientifically sound 
propositions about “reality”. There is no entity in the singular cognitive subject which could 
guarantee a “scientific” view of reality. “Scientific” propositions can only be formulated by 
researching objects as mass phenomena and by subjecting them to a process of a collective 
revision. Scientific work thus consists of the organization of empirical data (scientific objects) as 
well as of the organization of the constructive part of cognitive processes in collaboration and co-
operation (cognitive subjects). Since, in the investigation of mass phenomena, one is confronted 
with an infinite number of elements, the individual researcher can – due to limited time and 
ability – only pick out isolated elements at random.29 Only the co-operative collection of a mass 
of data would be able to balance out statistically the haphazardness of investigation.  
The attempt to “define the yet undefined” mass of empirical data transforms knowledge into an 
infinite process. Its aim is not truth knowledge but the creation of new rationalized realms. Zilsel 
provides a procedural and operational foundation for the production of knowledge from yet 
unsystematized mass phenomena. Zilsel’s search for historical laws therefore is to be understood 
as an attempt to save rational thinking in the tradition of modern science. His anti-individualistic 
epistemological theory must also be read as an alternative account to contemporary philosophical 
tendencies that emphasized understanding based on individual empathy. As we learn from the 
conceptual structure of his book “The Religion of Genius” (1918), Zilsel criticized the admiration 
and the empathetic understanding of a person as “genius” for it only functions in opposition to 
and disrespecting an ignorant mass of people that does not understand. His epistemological 
position methodologically discarded a concept of knowledge and understanding as special 
                                                
29 Zilsel (1926), p. 323: ”der Einzelne wird immer nur auf Einzelgebieten einzelne und höchst zufällige Materialien 
zusammentragen können, was alle seine Schlüsse fast entwertet.“ 
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personal abilities. The problem of cognition was not how to establish a correct perspective on a 
single object starting from the condition of a previous ignorance. Instead, his epistemological 
theory emphasized that all scientific disciplines (and also the formation of everyday experience) 
were confronted with the same constructive problem of how to organize the large number of 
interrelated data forming the phenomenon of a cognitive object. In its relational understanding of 
the inner mass structure of cognitive objects, Zilsel’s epistemology simultaneously connects the 
constructive as well as the empirical aspects of mass data collection. It is in this intersection that 
the collaborative and organized work on the collection and constructive processing of data needs 
to be related to a specific standpoint of investigation in order to research the external reality as an 
“irrational” mass formation. Based on this epistemological perspective on the interrelation of 
empirical and theoretical practices, Zilsel started to spell out the involved agencies in the 
constructive part of scientific work by specific sociological and historical research and by 
rereading them against the background of a Marxist perspective on society and social processes. 
